Dalits and the Muslims. Indeed, until the early 1990s, the Congress' dominance formula had lied upon this capacity to encompass contending social groups. It was a genuine 'catch-all party'. In the 1967 general elections for example, the vote in favour of the Congress did almost not vary according to the level of income (Madsen 1970: 100) . In North India, it was more specifically based on a 'coalition of extremes' to use the terms of Paul Brass (1980: 5) , since its principal supports came from the Brahmins, the Scheduled Castes and the Muslims. The party thus blurred two cleavages, the one opposing the high and the low castes, and the one separating religious communities. The same technique turned out to be successful in other regions too. The all India opinion polls conducted by the CSDS show that till the 1980s, the Congress party was able to attract between 35.8% and 50.5% of the voters from any social group 2 . In 1989, the Brahmins, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Muslims were still overrepresented within the Congress (I) electorate. According to an opinion poll survey, carried out after the 1989 elections, where the Congress (I) won 39.5% of the valid votes, it received the support of 41% of the Brahmins who were interviewed, 44.2% of the SCs/STs and 45.8% of the Muslims.
[3] But, as Table 1 shows, the 1990s witnessed an erosion of the Congress attraction amongst all sections. The BJP and a large number of regional parties were the chief beneficiaries of this decline, of this disintegration of the social coalition that sustained the party's electoral success (Chandra 2004 , Chhibber 1999 , Jaffrelot 2003 . And if the Congress could not play the role of a catch-all party anymore, some argued that the national character of Indian politics would be at stake (Yadav 2000) . Jaffrelot, Christophe ; Verniers, Gilles 'India's [4] Yet, in 2009, the Congress performed very well in terms of seats in the Assembly, a feat even more remarkable that it was already in office since 2004. It had never won so many seats since 1991. where total votes increased of 6.4% (the party lost one seat in the former but gained 8 in the latter), and in Punjab where they increased of 11% (with an additional 6 seats). [7] The success of the Congress is largely due to its President Sonia Gandhi whose prestige improved because of the way she gave up the trappings of executive power when she decided not to be the PM. She is very much in command of the Congress, a party which, otherwise, would be divided into many factions, as during the Narasimha Rao years (1991-96) 6 :
being above factions, with the mantle of the 'dynasty' on her shoulders, she neutralizes them and maintains the cohesion of the party -and that of the United Progressive Alliance ( [8] The success of the Congress is also due to some of its best thought out policies, such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which institutes a minimal guaranteed wage (amounting to one hundred days of work hours per annum, at government-fixed rates) to all rural casual workers 8 ; the Right to Information Act, which obliges the bureaucracy to explain its decisions when asked by concerned citizens; and the implementation of a 27% quota for the OBCs in the university where, according to surveys, the Dalits were in larger number than the OBCs because of reservations 9 . All this pleased a popular electorate, which was also sensitive to the fall of the inflation rate: in India, a double-digit inflation can make a government 6 As shown by the fact that Arjun Singh, the 'number two' in the government, then dropped his ministerial portfolio (in December 1994), particularly reproaching to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao his liberal policy that penalized the poor and his incapacity to regain the confidence of the Muslims. Shortly afterwards, he was expelled from the Congress. He founded later on the Congress (T) with N.D. Tiwari, the head of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh. Obviously, the absence of a representative of the Nehru/Gandhi lineage at the helm of the party removed the inhibitions that, till then, had restrained the appetites of factions' leaders. 7 President of the Bahujan Samaj Party, Mayawati is the state's current Chief Minister. Mulayam Singh Yadav and Rajnath Singh are former Chief Ministers and respective Presidents of the Samajwadi Party and the BJP. 8 According to the CSDS exit poll, 31% of the rural poor and 29% of the rural very poor said that they had benefited from the NREGA, which is more than the level of support for any other previous or existing poverty-alleviation program (Yadav & Palshikar 2009). 9 In the previous quota regime, the 27% of reservation for OBC was limited to the public service and elective assemblies. Its extension to institutions of higher education -in particular the elitist Indian Institutes of Technologies (IITs) and of Management (IIMs), as well as the public medical schools (AIIMS) -stirred a violent debate between proponents of meritocracy and proponents of reservation policies. fall whereas the growth rate (on the decline since mid-2007) does not play such a big role in a country used to slow growth till the 1990s. The urban middle class also appreciated the 2008 nuclear deal with the US -through which Washington agreed to transfer civil nuclear energy technology to India in spite of the fact that the country had not signed the TNP -, not only for the mark of international recognition it represented, but also because of its implications in terms of energy.
[9] This being said, neither the success of the Congress, nor the 're-nationalization' of Indian politics that it is supposed to reflect according to the media 10 must be overrated. The
Congress has won 61 seats more than in 2004, but it has improved its score in terms of valid votes by only 2%. In fact, the party has won approximately 27% of the valid votes in every election since 1996. The graph below shows that the two largest parties, Congress and BJP, are actually not making significant progress, whereas the regional parties are: in other words, there is no 're-nationalization' of politics in India, but a constant trend towards regionalization. As a matter of fact, regional parties got more valid votes in 2009 than the Congress and BJP combined, thus confirming a trend already visible for the first time during the 2004 elections (see Table 5 ). Partyof about 20 seats -which have mostly gone to the Congress -by winning 160 000 votes per constituency on an average. In Maharashtra, the Congress and its ally, the Nationalist Congress Party won all the six seats of Mumbai thanks to the 126,000 votes that Raj Thackeray's Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (a breakaway faction of the Shiv Sena) won on an average in these constituencies -otherwise some of them at least would have been won by the Shiv Sena and/or its ally, the BJP. In Tamil Nadu, the emergence of a new party, the Dravida Munnetra 
II. Who Are the Real Losers?
[12] The first real loser of the elections is the BJP. vote share, the BJP loses ground in 21 states out of 28. The 82 year old L.K. Advani, whom the BJP had projected as its prime ministerial candidate, announced his resignation from the post of leader of the opposition immediately after the elections, despite the fact that he had been asked by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the mother organization of the Sangh Parivar, to hold it back till the end of the year. The party is since undergoing a difficult succession process.
[13] But this is an exceptional scenario because in general the BJP found itself rather Not only did former allies abandon the BJP, but those which remained in the NDA were also not as successful as the Congress' allies. The Akali Dal has lost three seats in Punjab and the Shiv Sena one in Maharashtra. Yet, the Janata Dal (U), with 20 of 40 seats in Bihar has done very well, helping the BJP to win 9 seats.
[14] If the BJP is the biggest loser of the elections because it was plausibly expected to be back in office, the most dramatic defeat has been that of the Communists, who never won so few seats: a mere 24. Their setback is especially marked in their traditional strongholds, Kerala and West Bengal, where they won only 4 and 12 seats respectively. In Kerala, the CPI(M) paid for its internal fights and some scandals of corruption. In West Bengal, this setback is partly a sequel of Nandigram and Singur, two issues that the TNC exploited skilfully 13 . The defeat of the 13 Nandigram and Singur are two rural localities where peasants mobilised against the CPI(M) government's decision to let big industrialists (including Tata) build factories on a very fertile lands. The repression of the first demonstrations, which occurred in March 2007, has been especially brutal in both cases. Haryana. The BSP, which fielded 500 candidates, has a national presence, more than any Dalit party before. As a result, and with more than 6% of the valid votes, it is now the third national party of India, ahead of the CPI(M).
III. Towards a De-ethnicized Voting Pattern?
[16] In India, the act of voting has always been partially over-determined by the ethnic identity of the citizen, be it based on religion, caste or language. As contentious as it may sound, the qualification 'ethnic voting' is frequently used in the academic literature as an encompassing and convenient notion regrouping the political and mobilization processes based on ascriptive identities, such as religious or caste-based groups (Chandra 2004 , Chhibber 1999 , Jaffrelot 2003 . When more than 50% of a caste group, tribe or religious community vote for one party, we can speak of 'ethnic voting', all the more so than a rival party will nominate candidates of the same caste in order to cut into its vote. This voting pattern reflects the very structure of the party system, regionalist parties articulating a linguistic identity (like the Dravidian parties) or a religious Source: CSDS Data Unit.
[18] Ethnic voting is especially obvious at the state level given the regional dimension of castes -most of them (especially the dominant castes) do not expand beyond a linguistic area, often coterminous with one state
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. A few examples will suffice to make this point. In Andhra 15 The resilience of identity politics at the state level weakens considerably the argument Yadav and Palshikar try to make: 'While caste or community continues to be the primary building bloc of political affiliation at the micro level, the politics of building a macro political coalitions based on these blocs has suffered a setback' (Yadav & Palshikar 2009: 38) . Such an assertion is puzzling since the level at which 
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. In UP, 53% of the Brahmins, 53% of the Rajputs and 54% of the other upper castes voted for the BJP whereas 84% of the Jatavs 17 and 64% of the other Dalits voted for the BSP (Ibid: 5). In Karnataka, 73% of the Lingayats 18 voted for the BJP (Shastri, Suri et al., 2009: 117) .
In Rajasthan, 74% of the Brahmins, 55% of the Rajputs and 59% of the Jats voted for the BJP, whereas 66% of the Dalits, 55% of the Tribals and 82% of the Muslims voted for the Congress (Lodha 2009: 189) . In some states, the electoral preferences of the voters can be better understood by looking at the sub-caste level. This fragmentation -which recalls the one we observed at the territorial level with the emergence of sub-regional parties -is especially obvious in the case of dominant castes. In Gujarat, the Patels 19 need to be disaggregated that way. Two groups, the Karwa and Leuva Patels, have overwhelmingly supported the BJP -87% of them did -during the last Lok Sabha elections (Jani 2009: 135) . So far as the Muslims are concerned, 59%
of them voted for the Congress-TNC alliance in West Bengal, 77% of them supported the Congress in Delhi, 67% in Gujarat, 68% in Karnataka, 64% in Madhya Pradesh, and 82% in Rajasthan (Alam 2009: 94) . Such figures do not mean that the Congress is not a catch-all party anymore -it still attracts voters from different segments -, but it does show that many groups continue to vote en bloc.
IV. Class Vote?
[19] If caste voting remains all pervading, it is much more difficult to identify the emergence of class voting in India. In 2004, as shown in table 7, the BJP, despite its defeat, had remained the party of the middle class and the elite: the richer the Indian voter, the more he/she voted for the BJP, whereas in the case of the Congress, the correlation was the reverse.
caste has always played a key role is the state, not the locality -and certainly not the nation -and it is still the case, as evident from the CSDS data they are themselves using. Source : CSDS Data Unit.
[20] In 2009, this type of linear relation no longer held good for the rural milieu -the one that matters the most
20
. Here, the rich voted as much as the poor for the Congress and -one of the striking aspects of these elections -the BJP was no longer the party of the well-heeled, whether urban or rural, who voted like the poor for the Congress. The latter succeeded on both fronts: on the one hand, Manmohan Singh's economic policies, based on balanced liberalization measures, drew the wealthy urban milieus. On the other hand, the flagship social schemesidentified moreover with Sonia Gandhi -was a magnet for the poorer rural milieus. 20 According to the CSDS' NES, the rural electorate represents 71.8% of the total electorate. Source: CSDS Data Unit.
[21] This trend does not prevent the BJP from remaining an urban-based party, as the voters' desertion was more pronounced among the poor in the rural rather than urban areas. One linear relation that persists is education: the CSDS survey reveals that the more educated the Indian voter, the more likely he or she is to vote for the BJP. But this, again, has more to do with caste than class. otherwise, its performance in terms of seats does not reflect its real popularity. This optical illusion stems firstly from the single-round majoritarian voting system, which meant that the growing fragmentation of the regional political scenes, particularly in the case of triangular or quadrangular competitions, has acted in favour of the Congress, the most consistent though not dominant player.
Conclusion
[23] The distortion between vote-shares and results in terms of seats -due to the voting system -is not a new phenomenon in India, where the electoral fate of parties always depends more on their adversaries' performances than on their own. Even if the Congress has often [24 The other conclusion we can draw from our study is that these elections demonstrate once again that the regional level is the most determining one. In the CSDS post-poll National Election survey, 70% of those interviewed considered loyalty to their region to be more important than loyalty to the nation; only 14% of those interviewed thought otherwise (The Hindu 2009). The
Indian general elections continue to be the aggregate of 28 regional elections, each displaying its social, political and economic specificities. In such a context, regional parties will continue to rise.
With a total of 52.54% vote share, against 47.36% for the Congress and BJP clubbed together, regional parties attract an absolute majority of voters. This trend has been on a continuous rise since 1999. Not only are regional parties progressing but they are also multiplying, and the most important among them fail to become 'meta-regional', to take root in neighbouring states. Even if the BSP managed to penetrate in Haryana for instance, and garner a few votes in some subregional pockets (Vidharba, notably), these elections confirm the fact that regional parties remain confined to the states from which they originate. The vote share of the so-called 'multi-state' parties has been on a constant decline since 1999, falling from 20.11% to 16.24% of the votes. In sum, the fragmentation of the political scene confirms India's entry into the 'coalition era'. As always, post-poll negotiations have been tense, the formation and survival of the Government depending on the goodwill of regional -even local -players. What kind of policies will this coalition government implement? It is particularly difficult to draw a lesson from these elections in terms of the mandate given to the government. Of course, the propoor redistributive policies of the Congress contributed to its electoral success and it is understood that the electorate expects the party to follow the same direction. But it is equally interesting to point out what the voters did not say. These elections, for instance, cannot be interpreted as a call for the pursuit of liberalization and deregulation policies. This is borne out in the Congress' loss in vote share in all economically advanced states (Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka). Nonetheless, these liberalization, even privatization, policies will continue at a pace dependent on Manmohan Singh's ability to convince its most reluctant partners -the DMK and the TNC -but also Sonia Gandhi herself, that it would be the best development strategy to follow in a period of economic slowdown.
